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SUMMARY: 1. The main features of the Italian electoral system for the EU Parliament election. – 2. The 
electoral campaigns for the EP election. – 3. From Europe towards the Italian results. – 4. The regional effects 
of the results of the EU elections. – 5. The crises of the “Yellow-Green” Government. 
 
 
1. The main features of the Italian electoral system for the EU Parliament election 
 
In Italy, the elections of the members of the European Parliament were held on the 26th May 2019. 
Firstly, the decision of the European Council no. 937 of 2018 should be considered. According to 
this, 76 seats of the EP were allocated to Italy starting from the 2019 legislature (as we know, the 
MEPs are 751).  
However, as specified by the Court of Cassation on the 21st May 2019, of these 76 European 
parliamentarians assigned to Italy, only 73 will take over immediately, while the remaining 3 seats 
will be given only after the UK has effectively left the EU. 
This means that if the UK does not leave the EU, Italy will have 73 seats for the entire Legislature. 
We voted with the electoral system established by law no. 18 of 1979 (law about the “Election of 
the Italian members of the European Parliament”).  
The right to vote is exercised by citizens at least 18 years old, while for candidates, the minimum 
age is 25 years. 
Let’s look in more detail: 
1) The electoral districts 
The Italian national territory is divided into 5 plurinominal districts, in which the seats are allocated 
in proportion to the population. 
Each constituency consists of several regions, according to the following list and graphic: 
1. North-western Italy (Valle d’Aosta, Piemonte, Liguria, Lombardia): No. 20 seats 
2. North-eastern Italy (Trentino-Alto Adige, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Emilia-Romagna): 
No. 15 seats 
3. Central Italy (Toscana, Umbria, Marche, Lazio): No. 15 seats 
4. Southern Italy (Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria): No. 18 seats 
5. Insular Italy (Sicilia, Sardegna): No. 8 seats 
 
 
Italian electoral districts for the 
EP election 
 Seats Laegue 
No. 
PD 
No. 
M5S 
No. 
FI 
No. 
FdL 
No. 
SVP 
No. 
I 
 
 
 
20 9 5 2 2 2 0 
II 15 7 4 2 0 1 1 
                                                 
* Testo rielaborato dell’intervento svolto nell’ambito della Conferenza internazionale svoltasi a Madrid nei giorni 19 
e 20 settembre 2019, sul tema: “Las elecciones europeas en Italia”. 
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III 
 
 
 
15 6 4 2 2 1 0 
IV 
 
 
 
18 5 4 6 2 1 0 
V 
 
8 2 2 2 1 1 0 
 
 
Each candidacy can be presented in more than one constituency (i.e. “multiple candidatures”).  
A total of eighteen lists competed in the European Parliament (EP) elections, as a product of a 
strongly multi-party format. 
2) The voting system 
In each list, candidates of the same sex cannot be more than half and the top two candidates on the 
list must not be of the same sex (i.e. “Equal opportunities”). 
The ballot paper is unique. 
The law provides for a multiple preference vote for the candidates on the same list: each voter can 
express his/her preference for one of the lists and choose up to three candidates in the same district 
list, according to the ranking of alternative consents. 
This means that, in the case of the expression of two or three preferences, these must be assigned 
to candidates of different sexes. 
If the preferences are not expressed to candidates of different sexes, the second or third preference 
will be cancelled. 
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3) The allocation of seats  
The lists that have achieved at least 4% of the valid votes cast at the national level are assigned 
seats (it means that a national threshold is in force). 
The seats are assigned to the lists in proportion to the votes obtained at the national level, with the 
system of whole quotients and highest remainders (i.e. “Hare method of natural quotients, and the 
highest remainders”). 
The seats obtained by each list are then reassigned to the districts in proportion to the votes 
obtained in each of them. 
Once the number of seats on the list in each constituency has been determined, the candidates with 
the greatest number of preference votes are declared elected). 
 
 
2. The electoral campaigns for the EP election  
 
Despite their purpose to elect a European Parliament, historically the electoral campaigns for the 
EP had very little focus on European programmes.  
For the first time, in 2014, though influenced by the consequences of the hardness of the economic 
policies imposed to Italy, the electoral campaign was more clearly “Europe oriented”. 
Specifically, it was the pro-European Democratic Party (PD) led by the Prime Minister Matteo 
Renzi to conduct the electoral campaign in this direction. 
In this occasion, the PD’s score was also the best result for an Italian party in a nationwide election 
in the last half century. 
After the defeat in the constitutional referendum, Renzi was forced to resign, and his foreign affairs 
minister Paolo Gentiloni was appointed as the new Prime Minister (in December 2016). 
In March 2018 the political elections took place in Italy: the anti-establishment “Five Star 
Movement” (M5S) led by Luigi Di Maio became the party with the most votes; the centre-right 
coalition came second (with the best result obtained by the League led by Matteo Salvini) and Renzi’s 
centre-left arrived only third. Nicola Zingaretti became the new Secretary of the Democratic Party. 
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The result of the general elections was non decisive in establishing the government because none 
of the political groups or parties obtained the most seats. 
Finally, after three months of negotiations, in June 2018, M5S and League formed an unusual 
government coalition (s.c. “yellow-green government”) with Giuseppe Conte (linked to the M5S) as 
Prime Minister and Di Maio and Salvini as vice-ministers. 
Differently from what happened in 2014 (see supra), in the 2019 EU elections the Italian electoral 
campaign was characterised by a strong opposition against the EU financial and economic policies 
by the “populist” political parties.  
In particular, the League focused its electoral campaign on the fight against illegal immigration 
and on the inefficiency of European policies in this matter. 
The safeguarding of the “yellow-green government” and the clash between two governing parties 
vying for leadership were the principal aims of the other political parties.  
The pre-electoral polls suggested that the M5S was on route to be punished by the electorate, while 
the League appeared to be increasing its consensus. For its part, despite its internal conflicts, the 
centre-left Democratic Party appeared to slowly recover in the polls, though it was still far from the 
far-right. 
Thus, in the imminence of the EU election, numerous conflicts between the two forces of 
government began to emerge. 
In conclusion, the EU electoral campaign seemed to have contaminated the relationship between 
the two political parties that composed most of the government.  
This confirmed the opinion according to which the campaign for the European elections would be 
just a continuation of the national political election (from March 2018 and regional elections from 
last March).  
Anyway, in Italy, the voter turnout slightly decreased compared to the previous European elections 
(from 57.22% to 54.5% of voters) and, albeit slightly, it remained above the European average 
(50.62% of voters). 
(see the diagram below) 
 
 
 
SOURCE: https://election-results.eu/ 
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3. From Europe towards the Italian results  
 
As we know, at the European level there has been a decline in the Party of European Socialists 
(with about 147 seats), while the People’s party (the EPP) became the first party (with 182 seats) by 
a wide margin over rivals. The so-called “Sovereign Parties” received only 60 seats. 
It means that the next European Parliament will likely be led by a coalition of pro-European forces 
(including the Social Democrats, the People’s Party, the Liberals and perhaps the Green, the Europe 
of Nations and Freedom). 
On the other hand, the far-right block (including the League and France’s National Party) gained 
seats from 2014 but is likely to remain the minority.  
 
 
 
SOURCE: https://election-results.eu/ 
 
In Italy, the League Party performed even better than expected in the European elections, winning 
more than 34 percent (the exit polls had estimated the party to reach 27-31 percent). 
The second biggest party, the centre-left Democrats (PD), reached 22.7 percent.  
The anti-establishment Five Star Movement (M5S), which governed in coalition with the League, 
took just 17.1 percent.  
 
[It should be clarified that I’m going to focus only on the three major political parties]. 
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As shown in the graph, the League increased its electoral consensus in an exponential manner 
compared to the 2014 European elections, the 2018 political elections, and the 2019 European 
elections. 
On the contrary, the M5S and the Democratic Party achieved a lower result than in both the 2014 
European elections and the 2018 political elections. 
More precisely, the League won 29 seats, the Democratic Party 19, the Five Star Movement 14, 
Forza Italia 8, while Fratelli d’Italia 6 and SVP 1. 
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The League’s success in Italy was highly relevant, but much less than in the rest of the EU: in fact 
at the EU level, the elections were hardly a triumph for the populist parties, since most of the results 
from the other countries showed the electoral bodies as pro-EU. 
It was immediately evident that, without any support from other EU leaders, it would have been 
impossible to achieve the ambitious objectives to bring about radical reforms of EU rules (in 
particular, regarding the relaxation of fiscal rules and the new mandate for the European Central 
Bank…). 
Perhaps it’s with this in mind that Salvini began to say that he wanted to “change the rules” of the 
EU from the inside. 
Anyway, the “yellow-green” government came to be dogged by markets, due to the fear that the 
coalition might engineer an “Italexit”. This pushed up Italian borrowing costs, but concerns receded 
thanks to the assurances of the Economy Minister (Giovanni Tria) that Italy would be fully committed 
to the Euro. 
Therefore, the risk of an Italian marginalisation became high, both in the European context and in 
relations with other European States». 
In particular, Marine Le Pen and Matteo Salvini’s MEPs joined forces with anti-immigration 
parties across Europe to create the biggest far-right group in the European parliament. 
Indeed, the attempts of the M5S to rebuild the “Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy” 
(EFDD) group with the Brexit Party failed, thus the 14 Five Star MEPs are doomed to slip back into 
the black-hole of non-attached members, as no other parliamentary group has agreed to team up with 
them so far. 
 
 
4. The regional effects of the results of the EU elections  
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SOURCE: https://it.sputniknews  
 
In regards the results result at regional and local levels of the EU election, an interesting analysis, 
shows that the League has gained around 41 percent of voters (it means more than a third of votes) 
in the north (compared to 34 percent nationwide). 
In particular, the region in which it was more successful, becoming the top party, was Veneto in 
the north-east, where it won just under 50 percent. 
Therefore, its reach spread toward the centre of Italy, across the traditional “Red zone” (of left-
wing supporters between Tuscany and Emilia-Romagna). 
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The Democrats won in Tuscany (33 percent) and in the northern and centre big cities (as Rome, 
Florence, Genoa and Turin); while it came second behind the League throughout the north and, in 
most of the south, it was relegated to third or even fourth place (gaining just 15 percent in Molise). 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: www.youtrend.it 
 
 
Regarding the Five Star Movement, the party topped 30 percent in some parts of southern Italy 
(its strongest region was the Campania region, where it won just under 34 percent). 
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Last but not least, we report below the results, municipality by municipality, of the 2018 Political 
Elections and those of the 2019 European Elections: the trend is clear, showing the erosion 
perpetrated against the M5S by the League Party. 
From an internal perspective, the results show that after just one year of government, the balance 
of power between Italy’s two ruling parties has been turned around:  
- The League doubled its score from last year’s 17.35% to 33.6%, while the Five Star Movement 
crumbled from 32.68% to 16.70%;  
- the Five Star Movement was also overtaken by the centre-left Democratic Party (PD), which 
came out ahead of the anti-establishment party, at 23.5%; and 
- the Democratic Party became the second largest Italian party in the European Parliament, 
bringing 18 seats to the assembly’s Socialists and Democrats group – just one seat less than the 
successful Spanish delegation. 
 
 
 
Even though the elections confirmed the positive outlook for centre-right parties, with the League 
in the lead in the immediate time, Salvini’s party decided not to spark a government crisis. 
Afterwards, on 16th July, with 383 votes in favour (the majority amounted to 376 seats), the 
European Parliament elected Ursula Von der Leyen President of the European Commission in a secret 
ballot. 
In this phase an episode occurred that would have proven decisive for the fate of the yellow-green 
Government and, more in general, for the entire Legislature. 
In fact, while the League voted against this candidature, the M5S delegation, on the contrary, voted 
in favour and gained credibility in the eyes of the EU. 
 
 
  tecniche normative 
 
11 
5. The crises of the “Yellow-Green” Government 
 
Just a month later, Salvini decided to trigger a political crisis by presenting a motion of no 
confidence against the President of the Council of Ministers (s.c. “Midsummer crisis”). 
Various opinions have been given about this political choice: a staple is that Salvini would have 
attempted to capitalise on his popularity to become Prime Minister, as stressed by Giuseppe Conte in 
his speech in the Senate when commenting on the government crisis and announcing his resignation. 
Furthermore, some opinions maintain that Salvini was led to do this. 
It was emphasised that with his aggressive policy, which reached its peak when he expressed his 
intention to have “full powers”, Salvini turned everyone, even his allies and party mates, against 
himself. 
Furthermore, the display of religious symbols on various occasions started to create friction with 
the Catholic world. 
On the international level, the s.c. “Russia gate” was another sign of his weakness.  
To all this, like previously said, must be added the non-consent of Salvini’s party to Angela 
Merkel’s EU Commission candidate Ursula Von der Leyen. 
Salvini, with this in mind, strongly invoked the return to the polls, perhaps underestimating the 
fact that in the Italian parliamentary system the early dissolution of the Chambers is an exclusive 
prerogative of the President of the Italian Republic (Sergio Mattarella). 
It’s possible to think that Salvini’s tactical error was to believe that during the month of August 
his plan would have gone unnoticed.  
He also did not imagine that the two contenders to lead the Democratic Party (Nicola Zingaretti 
and Matteo Renzi) would have lined up together for a s.c. “Red-Green” government. 
However, the other parties were aware that returning to the polls would immediately and certainly 
mean to help Salvini’s political purpose and hand over to the League Party (over 35%) the government 
of the country. 
In particular, the surveys still indicate that the PD and the M5S wouldn’t have won. In fact, the 
right-wing coalition between the League, Forza Italia and Brothers of Italy remains in some way the 
strongest grouping. 
Anyway, the country was plunged into a fresh political crisis after Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte 
quit as head of the ruling coalition. 
It was in this delicate moment that, former European Commission President Prodi proposed an 
alliance called “Ursula majority” for the future government. 
The alliance should prevent further participation of the ultra-right in the Italian Government and 
should make sure this consisted of all those who voted for Ursula von der Leyen a few weeks ago in 
the European Parliament: this means: M5S, PD and Forza Italia. 
This is the present situation. 
Finally, another criticality must be mentioned: In fact, it is believed that if we were asked back to 
vote with this electoral law in force (s.c. Rosatellum-bis), it would be more than likely that the current 
situation would represent itself or even get worse. 
Hence the need to proceed with the umpteenth reform of the law for political elections, but in this 
way, we are starting a new chapter that must be still fully written.  
